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Legal Education and Curriculum Innovation:
Law and Aging as a New Field of Law
Martin Lyon Levine*
"There are few things more fascinating in our jurisprudence than the or-
ganization of what comes, almost immediately, to be perceived as a
new field' of law."
-Grant Gilmore 1
How does it happen that we come to perceive the existence
of a new field2 of law? To perceive is an act of decision 3 that
might be made in many ways. The question of recognizing a
new legal field invites attention for a number of reasons. Clas-
sification, the process of grouping items, and division, the re-
verse process of breaking down a larger class into
subgroupings, are age-old concerns of philosophy.4 As a matter
of the organization of research, a scholar may seek criteria for
treating a particular bundle of issues as an interrelated set
forming a single whole, to be distinguished as a separate part of
the broader discipline.
As a matter of curriculum, a faculty may seek criteria for
recognizing one set of topics as a separate law course, rather
than as part of a larger unit or as a topic to be scattered among
other courses.5 As law schools recognize a new field, publish-
* Professor of Law, and Professor of Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sci-
ences, University of Southern California; President, National Senior Citizens
Law Center, Inc. I wish to thank Louis N. Brown, Lawrence M. Friedman, Ron-
ald A. Garet, Walter Gellhorn, Myres S. McDougall, Dr. Pauline K. Ragan, Dr.
K. Warner Schaie, Larry Simon, Peter Strauss, and especially Dr. Ralph S. Le-
vine, for their comments. Support for underlying research was provided
through the generosity of the UPS Foundation with the aid of Dean Scott H.
Bice and Dean James Birren.
1. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 9 (1974).
2. As defined here, a "field" of study is a subdivision within a broader dis-
cipline, such as law. For criteria that might be used in recognizing a discipline,
see Levine, Does Gerontology Exist?, 20 GERONTOLOGIST - (1980).
3. See, e.g., Steinberg, The Eye is a Part of the Mind, in REFLECTiONs ON
ART (S. Lange ed. 1961), reprinted in W. Bisim & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE,
AND ETIcs 1101 (1972).
4. Curriculum classification is a mundane cousin of the great philosophi-
cal problem of classification, which has been analyzed in a long tradition stem-
ming from Aristotle's Categories. See Thompson, Categories, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 46 (1967).
5. See Riesman, Law and Social Science: A Report on Michael and
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ers of research tools for practitioners are likely to do so also,
thus facilitating and promoting legal practice in the newly rec-
ognized area, as well as altering the analogies lawyers and
judges are likely to draw.6 Some law professors do not ask
questions about curriculum 7 because they implicitly assume
that the current classification is optimal or perhaps inherent in
the law.8 Others may think the current curriculum is adequate
or that the questions of classification and division are not im-
portant enough to warrant attention. Still others may believe
that curriculum change is best handled informally by the indi-
vidual teacher.9 Problems of classification and division, how-
ever, may confront any given faculty when there is an overall
curriculum review or when it is suggested that there be a
change in the list of required courses, electives, research insti-
tutes, or service programs.' 0
Wechsler's Classbook on Criminal Law and Administration, 50 YALE LJ 636,
642-44 (1941) (discussing the organization of courses and curricula). See also
Gardner, Specialization in the Law School Curriculum, 81 U. PA. L REV. 684,
687 (1933) ("Some [law school topics], like property and contracts, reflect popu-
lar notions about man's fundamental relations to his neighbor. Some, like torts,
reflect what was once the judicial organization of Great Britain. Some like tax-
ation, security transactions, or insurance, reflect a demand for instruction in
some specialty."); Riesman, In Memory of Harold S. Solomon: Comments on
Southern California's Flyer in Legal Education, 41 S. CAL. I REV. 506 (1968)
(discussing legal education reforms at U.S.C.); Riesman, Some Observations on
Legal Education, 1968 Wisc. L. REv. 63 (suggesting that law schools take an ap-
proach more closely oriented to social sciences); Stone, Towards a Theory of
Constitutional Law Casebooks, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 8-11 (1968) (discussing the
organization of casebooks).
6. This pattern is not intended to be exclusive. Certainly the needs of cli-
ents and practitioners may influence the adoption of a new legal field. See text
accompanying notes 87-119 infra.
7. But see Kelso, Curricular Reform for Law Schoo4- Needs of the Future,
21 U. MIAMI L. REv. 526 (1967). "[B]y what criteria do our first year courses jus-
tify their continued required existence: frequency of application; social signifi-
cance; doctrinal fundamentality?" Id. at 528. While Kelso supposed that
fundamentality of doctrine is the usual answer, he questioned whether the
property, torts, or contracts courses actually were fundamental, and suggested
more topical courses. Id.
8. Plato, Aristotle, and philosophers typified by the "realists" of the Mid-
dle Ages believed that groups and classes of things are learned by reason or by
observation; they are not simply mental conventions. See Hancock, History of
Metaphysics, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 289, 292 (1967).
9. "[Alterations in content are] produced by the internal combustion of
the professor in charge of the course, who, consulting his own notions of what
was timely or, at any rate, what interested him, went ahead and changed the
curriculum." Gellhorn, Commentary, 21 U. MIm U REV. 536, 537 (1967). Simi-
larly, another commentator maintains: "[TJhe new 'area' is often recognized
and articulated after the curricular change has already been established by the
seepage of updated materials." Rutter, Designing and Teaching the First De-
gree Law Curriculum, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 7, 11 (1968).
10. See, e.g., Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, in
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There are manifest reasons why Law and Aging" should at
least be considered a candidate for recognition as a new field
for law practice, teaching, and research. The United States and
other industrialized nations are experiencing an increase in the
number and percentage of elderly in their populations12 that is
unprecedented in the history of the world. Although in 1900
there were fewer than five million Americans over the age of
sixty, amounting to about 4% of the population, there are now
approximately thirty-two million elderly, constituting almost
11% of the nation.13 Demographic projections suggest that the
percentage of elderly Americans will increase in the next half-
century to perhaps as much as 17%.14 By one estimate, 24% of
the federal budget currently goes to support programs for older
persons, and within half a century such programs may require
40% of the budget.15
Since differentiation among legal fields primarily affects le-
gal teaching and scholarship, this Article derives criteria for the
recognition of new legal fields from alternative visions of law
schools-what they are and what they do. Applying these crite-
ria to Law and Aging, the Article maintains that the time has
come to recognize Law and Aging as a new field of law.
LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 403, 517-18 nn.52-54 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds.
1971).
11. Law and Aging is not included in the standard lists of legal fields. See,
e.g., ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAw SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS
844-45 (1980). When the 7,877 teachers listed with the Association of American
Law Schools were surveyed, 29 responded that they taught courses, seminars,
or clinic programs in Law and Aging, 23 were involved in outside projects or
programs, and 27 were doing research and writing in the field. Twenty-two
professors listed themselves as using their own materials for teaching. (There
are, no doubt, others in the field who did not respond to the survey.) SeeINsTi-
TuTE OF LAw AND AGING, SURVEY OF NATIONAL LAw SCHOOL PROGRAMS AND
MATERIALS IN LAW AND AGING 42-44 (1978). See generally Levine, Research in
Law and Aging, 20 GERONrOLoGIST 163 (1980).
12. See Cowgill, The Aging of Populations and Societies, 415 ANNALS 1, 5
(1974). See also Eisele, Preface to id., at ix.
13. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SERIES P-23, No. 59, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS 3-4 (1978).
14. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SERIES P-23, No. 43, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS at i (1973); cf. Bouvier, Atlee & McVeigh, The Elderly in America, 30
POPULATION BULL. 1, 7 (1974) (13 to 15% of the population will be elderly).
15. See Nelson, Time of Trial: The Burdens of Old Age on the Family, L.A.
Times, Jan. 19, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 1, at 22, col. 6. By another estimate, more than
30% of the Federal budget is spent on programs for the elderly. Samuelson,
Busting the U.S. Budget-The Costs of an Aging America, 10 NAT'L J. 256 (1978).
These estimates may be high.
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I. FIVE VISIONS OF LAW SCHOOLS
Criteria for the recognition of new legal fields can be gener-
ated from different visions of legal education' 6 that reflect dif-
fering assumptions about purposes17 and methods.18 In this
section, five such visions will be presented: the Practice Model,
the Rules Model, the Principles Model, the Policy Model, and
what may be a new Fifth Model. These models of legal educa-
tion 19 are based on historical epochs in the development of
American law schools,20 but are used here as ideal types.2 1 In
reality these models are not mutually exclusive; in the past,
16. See generally H. PACKER & T. EHUICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDU-
CATION (1972); J. REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERI-
CAN UNIvERsrrY LAw SCHOOLS (1914); A. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC
PROFESSION OF THE LAW (1921); Stevens, supra note 10.
17. In response to the overall question, "What are the aims and objectives
of legal education?," the 1947 Committee on Curriculum of the Association of
American Law Schools considered six possibilities:
(1) To orient the student in relation to the problems, materials and
methods of the law?
(2) To fortify the student with as much basic information as may be
essential to a working knowledge of the law?
(3) To practice the student in the more important craft skills of the
law?
(4) To instruct the student in the nature and scope of the law as a
system?
(5) To inculcate an understanding of social background and of the
law's relation to its purpose?
(6) To cultivate sensitivity to professional responsibilities and an ap-
prdkiation of the lawyer's place in society?
Quoted in A. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 161-62 (1953).
18. Among the many competing methodologies in legal education today
are: lecture-text, case, legislative-statutory, historical, problem, conceptual,
functional, and transactional. See material cited by Del Duca, Continuing Eval-
uation of Law School Curricula-An Initial Survey, 20 J. LEGAL EDUC. 309, 310-
11 (1978). In addition, law courses today may emphasize skills training, profes-
sional responsibility-values orientation, clinical exposure, integration of law
and the social sciences, analysis of the judicial decision-making process, use of
empirical methods, and use of electronic data processing. Id. at 311-13.
19. Law schools can be differentiated in many ways, such as by how they
resolve the tension between the role of a professional school and that of a grad-
uate school, see Goldstein, Educational Planning at Yale, 21 U. MIAMI L REV.
520, 525 (1967); whether or not they accept the wider functions symbolized by
the "law center" concept, see Vanderbilt, The Mission of a Law Center, 27
N.Y.U. L. REV. 20 (1952); and the modes of interaction among students, faculty,
and administration, see generally Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Po-
lemic, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACT. 71 (1970); Stone, Legal Education on the
Couch, 85 HARv. L. REv. 392 (1971); Watson, The Quest for Professional Compe-
tence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. CIN. L REV. 91 (1968).
20. Others have classified the stages of the development of American legal
education differently. See, e.g., Pound, Some Comments on Law, Teachers and
Law Teaching, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 519, 520-21 (1951); Woodard, The Limits of Le-
gal Realism: An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L. REV. 689, 709 (1968).
21. See generally M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOIIC OR-
GANIZATION (1947).
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several visions were simultaneously represented, and this is
true within the law school today.
A. THE PRACTICE MODEL
In the earliest era of American legal education, most aspir-
ing lawyers learned on the job.22 In the Practice Model, law is
studied in a procedural and client-centered context. In appren-
ticeship training,23 the usual mode of practice learning, sub-
jects of study are generated by the flow of cases. Thus,
concepts are often raised out of logical order, skipped over en-
tirely, or combined in various patterns, as determined by the
facts of the cases. The senior lawyer guiding an apprentice
may attempt to supplement the limitations of the training
method by raising logically related questions or by lecturing.24
The mentor may also assign texts for study, or the student may
choose a series of law texts to read.25 To the extent that texts
are employed, the Practice Model is combined with another ap-
proach, typically the Rules Model.26
22. This practice may have originated in England, where the Inns of Court
dominated English legal education through about 1650; thereafter, lawyers ei-
ther "read law" in law offices, or followed a well-known list of recommended
books. P. SMrrH, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION FOR THE ENGLISH BAR 38-40 (London
1860). One nineteenth-century English writer on legal education advised
against beginning law study by reading texts or attending lectures, maintaining
instead that one should begin as a pupil in the chambers of practitioners. S.
WARREN, A PoPuLAR AND PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO LAw STUDIEs 396-403
(Am. ed. 1846) (1st ed. London 1835).
23. Beginning with the Colonial period, most aspiring lawyers prepared for
the bar through apprenticeships. See A. HARNO, supra note 17, at 19. A course
of attendance in a law office was required in nearly all states. Clerke, Appen-
dix to S. WARREN, supra note 22, at 627. Of course, some might try to educate
themselves solely out of books. SeeL. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
525 (1973). Lincoln wrote that the "cheapest, quickest and best way" to become
a lawyer was to "read. . . , get a license, and go to practice, and still keep read-
ing." Nortrup, The Education of a Western Lawyer, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 294,
294 (1968).
24. But the student "rarely receive[d] any kind of regular instruction"
from the practitioner. Clerke, Introduction to S. WARREN, supra note 22, at vii.
25. See, e.g., J. REDLICH, supra note 16, at 7-8.
26. In the Colonial period, the books available to students gave no compre-
hensive view of the law. See P. HAMLiN, LEGAL EDUCATION IN COLONIAL NEw
YORK 65-66 (1939). Coke's work, "the main reliance of all students, [was] in-
veighed against [for] the obscurity of its passages and the complexity of its ar-
rangement," id. at 70 n.35, and was deemed a "disorderly mass of crabbed
pendantry." Thayer, The Teaching of English Law at Universities, 9 HARv. L.
REV. 169, 179 (1895). By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
"Whatever else might be omitted, in any case, Blackstone's Commentaries
never were." Baldwin, The Study of Elementary Law, The Proper Beginning of
a Legal Education, 13 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1903). Blackstone taught for the first time
"the continuity, the unity, and the reason of the Common Law," C. WARREN, A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 177 (1911), and thus was "the stimulus... for
1980]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
B. THE RULES MODEL
The first American law schools that grew to supplement ap-
prenticeship training provided their students with lectures and
common law treatises or printed versions of the teachers' lec-
ture notes. These presentations of legal doctrines were rule-
oriented and often non-systematic. The early schools adopted
the standard divisions of the common law as units for curricu-
lum. These traditional titles did poor service as working classi-
fications for fields of the law, however, since the topics bore
little relation to each other, making it impossible to classify the
law or apply logically consistent canons of distinction.27
The titles were grouped into "courses" in arbitrary fashion
based on mere convenience.2 8 In the early law schools, it be-
came necessary to divide the curriculum when the schedule of
instruction lasted more than one year, or when there was more
than one teacher. The development of a schedule of courses at
Harvard, for example, was determined originally "by the neces-
sity of keeping two professors occupied."29 Professor Greenleaf
and Judge Story split the work between themselves, and then
divided their own work into further compartments, each of
which might combine two, three, or four texts. Although these
original divisions were organized to suit the convenience of stu-
dents and faculty, and not on the basis of the subjects taught,
the courses nevertheless survived as the components of the
Harvard curriculum.3 0 Even after the creation of the modem
law school curriculum, the trend through 1920 was based less
on an idea of "legal science" than on the requirements of a
rather rigid mechanical system. "Legal 'titles,' which never
possessed much logical significance [had] become stereotyped
divisions of the law, whose size [was] somewhat arbitrarily de-
termined."31
C. THE PRINCIPLES MODEL
Christopher Columbus Langdell is regarded as the inventor
our own early attempts at systematic legal education," Thayer, supra, at 170.
"[B]ut after all, his valuable work, without familiar explanations and practical
systematic exercises, affords inadequate help to most minds." Clerke, supra
note 24, at vii.
27. See A. REED, supra note 16, at 345.
28. Before Langdell, Harvard had "a curriculum without any rational se-
quence of subjects." J. AMES, Christopher Columbus Langdell, in LECTURES ON
LEGAL HiSTORY 467, 477 (1913).
29. A. REED, supra note 16, at 363.
30. Id. at 364-65.
31. Id. at 367.
[Vol. 65:267
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of modern American legal instruction 32 by virtue of the changes
he imposed in legal education after he became dean of the
Harvard Law School in 1870. His conceptual ordering became
the standard for law schools throughout the country.33 The
often quoted introduction to his 1871 casebook sets forth his an-
alytical approach:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines
. . . to be traced in the main through a series of cases .... If these
doctrines could be so classified and arranged that each should be found
in its proper place, and nowhere else, they would cease to be formida-
ble from their number.3 4
Langdell viewed the law as a science and the library as its labo-
ratory; law consisted of principles which were derived from the
cases by inductive reasoning.35 The task of legal scholarship
was to state those principles. The content of each law course in
a Langdellian model of legal education was determined by trac-
ing legal principles through a line of cases; course boundaries
were generated analytically from conceptual dividing lines. 36
The application of Langdell's model led to the definition of legal
fields in terms of their supposed underlying principles. With
32. See, e.g., J. REDLICH, supra note 16, at 9. Gilmore,'for example, wrote
that "Langdell's Cases on Contracts was the first casebook of all." G. GILMORE,
THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 125 n.3 (1977). But see note 42 infra.
33. Langdell's method became predominant over time. See L. FRIEDmAN,
supra note 23, at 534-35. At Notre Dame, for example, from 1869 through 1905
textbooks and lectures were the major instructional method; by 1905 the case
method had been adopted and remained the dominant technique until 1953,
when emphasis shifted to the problem method for second and third year stu-
dents. See P. MOORE, A CENTURY OF LAW AT NOTRE DAME 112 (1969). As of
1902, twelve schools had adopted the Langdellian system for their entire curric-
ulum; 48 had adopted it in part; 34 maintained either a text book system, or a
textbook and lecture system. See Huffcut, A Decade of Progress in Legal Edu-
cation, 25 REPORT OF THE TWENTY-FIFrH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
BAR AsSOCIAION 529, 541 (1902). By 1920, nearly every American law school
had assimilated Harvard's basic curriculum. See J. SEUGMAN, THE HIGH CrrA-
DEL: THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD LAw SCHOOL 42-44 (1978). There were some
holdouts, however. The University of Virginia Law School, for example, used a
lecture system until the 1930s. J. RrrcHiE, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS: A SHORT
HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW OF THE UNIVERSrry OF VIRGINIA FOR THE PERIOD
1826-1926, at 56 (1978).
34. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS at viii,
ix (1871).
35. See Langdell's 1886 address quoted in 2 C. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE
HARvARD LAw SCHOOL AND OF EARLY LEGAL CONDMTIONS IN AMERICA 374 (1908).
Langdel's method suggested that "the legal process was principally adjudica-
tion by logical reasoning deriving from immutable general principles." A. SuTH-
ERLAND, THE LAW AT HARvARD 177 (1967).
36. Thus, for example, it is not difficult to state the conceptual dichotomies
by which contracts can be distinguished from torts, torts from criminal law,
criminal law from criminal procedure, or criminal procedure from civil proce-
dure.
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respect to contract law, for example, Grant Gilmore observed
that "the idea that there was such a thing as a general law-or
theory-of contract seems never to have occurred to the legal
mind until Langdell stumbled across it."13
Of course, Langdell's innovations did not spring full-blown
from his brow. The idea that law is a "science" had occurred to
many before him,38 along with the idea that legal education
should be based on a "scientific" version of law.39 Even at
Litchfield, the first American law school, Judge Gould preferred
that law be taught in a manner similar to "other" sciences as a
system of consistent and rational principles, and organized his
own textbook accordingly.40 Gould declared it unsatisfactory to
treat law as the compilation of positive rules, taught in a way to
test the "mechanical strength of the reader's memory."41 Lang-
37. G. GiLMoRE, supra note 1, at 6. Of course, that contracts was a field of
its own, with its own law, was hardly a novel idea. See, e.g., T. PARSONS, THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS (6th ed. 1873). See generally A. REED, supra note 16, at 349.
38. Blackstone, for example, had written of a "science" of law, reducible to
principles. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COmmENTAmsE *4. He also called equity a "sci-
ence" by analogy to law, 3 id. at *55, and regarded legal judgments as 'owing"
from reasons or premises. 3 id. at *379. See generally D. BooRSTN, THE MYS-
TERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAw 20-25 (1941).
39. In this tradition, in the pre-Langdellian era at Harvard, Greenleaf
wrote of "instruction in the science of law," and Story of a "scientific system of
legal education." A. HARNo, supra note 17, at 43.
40. SeeJ. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADINGS IN CIViL AC-
TIONS, at vi-viii (2d ed. 1836). Hoffman, another early writer on legal education,
recommended that the law student read certain books "in a progressive succes-
sion." D. HOFFmAN, COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY at vii (1817). Hoffman, like Gould,
favored a systematic study based on principles, and referred to the statement
of Sir William Jones in his Essay on the Law of Bailments (1796):
The great science of jurisprudence, like that of the universe, consists of
many subordinate systems, all of which are connected by nice links,
and beautiful dependencies; and each of them, as I have fully per-
suaded myself, is reducible to a few plain elements, either the wise
maxims of national policy and general convenience, or the positive
rules of our forefathers, which are seldom deficient in wisdom or util-
ity. If law be a science and really deserve so sublime a name, it must
be founded on principle, and claim an exalted rank in the empire of
reason; but if it be merely an unconnected series of decrees and ordi-
nances, its use may remain, though its dignity be lessened, and he will
become the greatest lawyer who has the strongest habitual or artificial
memory.
D. HoFFmAw, supra, at x-xi. Thus, the Langdellian method of principles had
been long foreshadowed, and without Langdell's repudiation of policy consider-
ations.
41. J. GOULD, supra note 40, at ix. Judge Gould intended his treatise as in-
struction in "the science" of pleading. The doctrines were to be presented "not
as a compilation of positive rules; but as a system of consistent and rational
principles." Id. at viii. He considered "almost all our modem and most popular
treatises, upon the various other titles of the common law" to be wanting as
works of instruction in a "science" of law.
For while every other science is taught, by a detailed explication of its
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dell was not the first to believe that law students should learn
principles from cases,42 nor were Langdell and James Ames the
first to believe that the case method should be the basis of
classroom teaching.43 Langdell was, however, the first to shape
principles, the doctrines of the common law are usually exhibited, in
our legal treatises, as if they were the insulated enactments of positive
law-without reference to the reasons on which they rest. And thus
the common law is presented in most of our books, rather as an art,
than a science; and the acquisition of it made to depend, more upon the
mechanical strength of the reader's memory, than upon the exercise of
his understanding. But it has been left on record, by the highest legal
authority, that 'the law is unknown to him, who knoweth not the REA-
SON thereof.' An axiom, which cannot fail to command the assent of
every intelligent mind.
Id. at viii-ix. Similarly, Warren admonished the student to study books "of a
scientific and elementary character" before attempting books written "for prac-
tical use." S. WARREN, supra note 22, at 372.
42. The position that legal education best occurs "where the student ex-
tracts general rules and principles" by "searching out the proper principles in
confused and complicated cases" was stressed a century before Langdell. $.
WARREN, supra note 22, at 411 (quoting Starkie, Law Lecture, 2 LEGAL ExAm-
INER & L. CHRONICLE 517, 518 (1833)). Contrary to popular belief, Langdell's
Cases on Contracts (1871) was not the first casebook. See E. BENNEtr & F.
HEARD, A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES IN CRIMINAL LAw (1856).
43. See J. HURST, THE GRowTH OF AMERICAN LAw 261 (1950). Some evi-
dence exists from which we can discern the use of the case method prior to
Langdell. Clerke, who advocated the case method in 1846, see Clerke, supra
note 23, at 628-29, conducted his own law school, id. at 630, and may well have
used the method there.
John Norton Pomeroy's "method was not unlike the case system later per-
fected by Langdell. The students were expected to read cases and then to be
questioned on them in classes." 1 P.C. JEssuP, ELIRu ROOT 61 (1938). Elihu
Root recalled his teacher, Pomeroy, at NYU in the late 1860s:
Into the fields of conflicting decisions.., he would lead us with amaz-
ing vigor and enthusiasm, and presently order would appear, com-
pelled by ... high intelligence in the application of fundamental
principles to confused conditions .... His method of working was an
especially valuable example of thoroughness in the collection and test-
ing of all necessary data before beginning to reason towards conclu-
sions, and of breadth of view in determining what data were necessary
Letter from Elihu Root to John Norton Pomeroy's son (1906), quoted in id. at
62. Henry McPike, Class of 1881 at Hastings College of the Law, recalled that
Pomeroy used a case method at Hastings. Even in first-year courses, which
were primarily lectures, Pomeroy would sometimes "pause and quiz the class,
passing questions around indiscriminately, and treating all answers with grav-
ity, no matter how far off any of them might be." In an upper year, Pomeroy
"taught by 'the actual case method' referring constantly to the 'leading cases,
from which the text rule was deduced, and urged and encouraged the constant
reading and study of them."' T. BARNES, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAw: THE
FIRST CENTURY 113 (1978) (quoting HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, GOLDEN JUBILEE BOOK 1878-1928, at 41 (1928)).
Barnes explains that in the "Pomeroy System" the second year of courses was
"inductive . . . (working from the particular of cases to generalities of doc-
trines)." Id. at 110.
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the whole program of a school upon these ideas.44 After Lang-
dell's disciple Ames, the archetypal law teacher was a cross-ex-
aminer and discussion leader-a style we term Socratic.45
Langdell's Harvard, a school devoted to "pure law,"46 was
actually a mixture of the models of legal education. His col-
leagues were less devoted than he to Langdellian purity,47 and
even he did not totally eschew the methods of the Rules
Model.48 Nor was his method of legal scholarship totally devoid
of a policy-oriented approach. It is true that in the 1879 second
edition of his casebook, Langdell rejected the notion that the
logical integrity of a sysiem of laws could be superseded by
policy considerations. Though one might frame an argument
on "substantial justice," the understanding of the contracting
parties, or the avoidance of "unjust" and "absurd" results,
Langdell wrote, "[t] he true answer to this argument, is that it
is irrelevant."49 Seizing upon Langdell's statement, Oliver
44. J. HURST, supra note 43, at 264.
45. The notion that law teaching is Socratic seems based on the Socrates
of the Meno *81-85 who teaches geometry to a slaveboy by asking questions. 1
THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 279-84 (4th ed. B. Jowett trans. 1953). In the same
vein, Socrates calls himself a midwife of the mind in Theaetetus *150, "and the
triumph of my art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the
mind of the young man brings forth is false and lifeless, or fertile and true." 3
id. at 245. In the Sophist *230-231, the "Stranger" describes those educators
whose method is to "cross-examine a man's words when he thinks that he is
saying something and is really saying nothing, and easily convict him of incon-
sistencies in his opinions." 3 id. at 378. This is a purging of prejudices through
refutation. The Stranger also speaks, however, of other methods of instruction.
Some attempt to educate through admonition, by roughly reproving errors.
And, while the Sophists have a certain likeness to the "cross-examination" sort
of education described, it is "the same sort of likeness which a wolf, who is the
fiercest of animals, has to a dog, who is the gentlest." 3 id. at 379. Moreover,
the Sophists teach an art of disputing about all things, and therefore errone-
ously appear all-wise to their disciples. 3 id. at 380-82. Socratic legal education
is sometimes accused of being more like that of the Sophists. See J. OSBORN,
THE PAPER CHASE (1973); Kennedy, supra note 19, at 72-73.
46. See, e.g., F. ELLswORTH, LAw ON THE MIDWAY: THE FOUNDING OF THE
UNIVERsrrY OF CHICAGO LAw SCHOOL 92 (1977).
47. See Hand, Foreward to S. WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAw (1941), reprinted
in I. DILLARD, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED
HAND 106 (1959).
48. Langdell included an appendix to the second edition of his casebook
that consisted of a set of rules, albeit systematically arranged (as was, of
course, Judge Gould's text). See 2 C. LANGDELi, A SELECTION OF CASES ON T
LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1879) [hereinafter cited as LANGDELL ON CON-
TRACTS]. The rules were also published separately. C. LANGDELi, A SUMMARY
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1880). Indeed, textbooks were widely used
along with the case method. See J. REDLICH, supra note 16, at 49-50. A search
for principles through cases may have occupied Langdell's class time, but the
students could not be weaned so easily from the old method.
49. 2 LANGDELL ON CONTRACTS, supra note 48, at 996.
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Wendell Holmes, Jr., concluded: "He is, perhaps, the greatest
living legal theologian. But as a theologian he is less concerned
with his postulates than to show that the conclusions from
them hang together."50 With all due respect, however, Holmes
was unfair in his analysis. Although Langdell may have re-
garded logic as the touchstone of legal analysis, he also en-
gaged in policy analysis of the most modern sort.51 Thus, the
"ideal type" of the Principles Model seems never to have ex-
isted as such, even under Langdell.
D. THE POLICY MODEL
Throughout this century, there have been attempts to shift
the emphasis of the law school from the Langdellian vision to
what may be called a Policy Model.52 As early as 1909, Roscoe
50. Book Note, 14 N.Y. L. REV. (previously Ai. L. REv.) 233, 234 (1880) (un-
signed, by Holmes). Holmes also noted:
[I]n this word "consistency" we touch what some of us at least must
deem the weak point in Mr. Langdell's habit of mind. Mr. Langdell's
ideal in the law, the end of all his striving, is the elegantiajuris, or logi-
cal integrity of the system as a system....
If Mr. Langdell could be suspected of ever having troubled himself
about Hegel, we might call him a Hegelian in disguise, so entirely is he
interested in the formal connection of things, or logic, as distinguished
from the feelings which make the content of logic, and which have ac-
tually shaped the substance of the law.
51. Langdell continued, immediately following the text which Holmes
quoted, to write, "but, assuming [the argument about just results] to be rele-
vant, it may be turned against those who use it without losing any of its
strength." 2 LANGDELL ON CONTRACTS, supra note 48, at 996. Langdell then
presented detailed policy arguments: when a hardship must be imposed on
one of two innocent parties it is preferable to leave the situation in status quo;
it is improper to impose a liability on which no limit can be placed; and liability
should be placed on the party for whom it is easiest to make provision for the
contingency. See id. The last of Langdell's policy arguments, in particular, has
a modern ring. Cf. Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 n.19 (1972) (imposing accident costs on "the
cheapest cost avoider"). Thus, the very exemplar of the Principles Model,
Langdell's casebook, approached both the Policy Model and the Rules Model
far more than is generally appreciated.
52. Johnson views 1930 as the date by which the "scientific historicism" of
Langdell was widely abandoned for an approach that emphasized the social sci-
ences, law as it actually functioned in society, sociological jurisprudence, or le-
gal realism. (He finds that 1930 is also the first date by which legal education
had become centered in the law schools.) W. JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAwYERS: A
STUDY IN THE CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES 154 (1978). Dickinson still felt
the need to argue in 1931 that "the time has come" to bring students into con-
tact with more noncommercial fields of law, and to promote their taking a "leg-
islative" attitude toward the law. Dickinson, Legal Education and the Law
School Curriculum, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 424, 436 (1931). Gilmore wrote that by
1940, the jurisprudential revolution had succeeded and the "conceptualism" of
Langdell was held up to scorn. G. GiLMORE, supra note 32, at 86-87. Today,
Langdellian conceptualism survives, see note 82 infra, along with scorn of it.
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Pound called for the abandonment of the "method of deduction
from predetermined conceptions" and for the adoption instead
of a sociological jurisprudence emphasizing the human factor
and the social structure within which law operates.5 3 This ju-
risprudence implied that the curriculum should be reorganized
in response to social change and that law students should be
trained for roles as decisionmakers. The legal realists further
undermined the jurisprudential bases of the Principles Model
by focusing attention on the factual realities of law and govern-
ment.5 4
Several law schools led the way in curricular changes after
World War J.55 Columbia initiated an early round of extensive
curricular debates on a "functional" legal education. 6 Yale at-
tempted the great experiment of bringing social scientists into
the law school.57 The Johns Hopkins University made a short-
lived attempt to treat law in the manner of a graduate school
53. See generally Pound, Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence
(pts. 1-2), 24 HAzv. L. REV. 591 (1911) and 25 HARv. L. REV. 140 (1912).
54. See generally Gilmore, Legal Realism Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE
L.I. 1037 (1961). For the conclusion that we are all realists now, see C.
AUERBACH, L. GARRISON, W. HURST & S. MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS 361
(1961).
55. In 1937, the University of Chicago curriculum received widespread at-
tehtion when the school compressed and shifted private law material to make
room for new courses. E. BROWN, LAWYERS, LAw SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC
SERVICE 98 (1948). Earlier, when the University of Chicago law school was
organized in 1902-03, the planners "were influenced by the German system of
legal education as they put together a curriculum committed to the 'whole field
of man as a social being,'-a curriculum that extended beyond the 'pure law' of
the Harvard model." F. ELLSWORTH, supra note 46, at 110. However, Beale, the
funding dean, insisted that the Chicago curriculum be limited to "strictly legal
subjedts," and courses such as American Political Theory and Jurisprudence
were abandoned. Levi, The Politica4 the Professiona and the Prudent in Legal
Edtication, 11 J. LEGAL EDUC. 457 (1959).
. 56.. The Columbia curriculum reforms of the 1920's turned away from law
as a body of technical doctrine. Dean Stone noted the need for "re-arranging
and organizing the subjects of law school study to make more apparent the re-
lationship of the various technical devices of the law to the particular social or
economic function with which they are concerned." Stone, The Future of Legal
Education, 10 A.B.A.J. 233, 234 (1924).
57. In 1916 a committee issued "A Program for the Expansion of the Yale
School of Law into a School of Law and Jurisprudence." Stevens, supra note
10, at 470-71. After World War I, there were movements to revise curricula, in-
clude social science approaches in courses, and take account of realist jurispru-
dence. "The new approach assumed ... that the traditional categories of law
are irrelevant ... " Id. at 475. In 1950, the Yale law curriculum of a later gen-
eration was reviewed by a committee of lawyers that concluded that there was
justification for including in the curriculum courses from outside the traditional
legal fields. Embree, How Should Lawyers be Educated? A Report on the Yale
Law Curriculum, 37 A.B.AJ. 655, 657 (1951).
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discipline.5 8 Northwestern perhaps carried the functional ap-
proach farthest.5 9 Harvard held out for decades for the
"straight law" of "traditional 'casebook courses,"' until it too
finally yielded, giving its influential imprimatur to the newer
approaches.60 Today, what may be called the Policy Model of
legal education has widespread influence 6 ' and is particularly
significant in those schools with upwardly-mobile aspirations.
The Policy Model has several facets. The law library, Lang-
dell notwithstanding, is not the law's only laboratory. Lawyers
must master data on society beyond the scope of case reports.
The designation "casebook" has become a misnomer for what
are often "heterogeneous collections of diverse materials," 62
commonly labelled "Cases and Materials on Contracts," rather
than merely "Cases on Contracts." Legal study often becomes
58. The research approach is embodied in the legal studies that were pro-
duced. See, e.g., JoHNs HOPKINS UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LAW, STUDY OF CIVIL
JUSTICE IN NEW YORK: SURVEY OF LITIGATION IN NEW YORK (1931); JOHNS HOP-
IUNS UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LAW, STUDY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF
MARYLAND (1930-32); JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LAW, STUDY OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN OHIO (1930-32).
59. See E. BROWN, supra note 55, at 101.
60. A well known law school myth (albeit much exaggerated) labels the
old and new approaches with the names of Harvard and Yale. See Navasky,
The Yales vs. the Harvards (Legal Division), N.Y. Times, Sept 11, 1966, § 6
(Magazine), at 47. Harvard's curriculum after the Langdellian reforms of 1877
was considered to be based on the "fundamental plan ... to teach law in the
strict sense of the word," excluding social science. Levi, supra note 55, at 464.
When the curriculum (which had been revised in the interim in 1915) was re-
vised again in 1934-37, the draftsmen acknowledged it might be criticized for
over-emphasis on traditional law. See Simpson, The New Curriculum of the
Harvard Law School, 51 HARV. L. REV. 965, 980-81 (1938). Harvard's "new" cur-
riculum" was still characterized as three years devoted to "what our English
brethren call 'straight law."' Simpson, Developments in the Law School Curric-
ulum and in Teaching Methods, 8 Ame. L. SCH. REV. 1038, 1040 (1938). The new
approach eventually had significant influence, even at Harvard: for example,
what during the 1920s were "separate traditional 'casebook courses"' in negoti-
able instruments, sales, and security devices, were combined in a single com-
mercial law course. A. SUTHERLAND, supra note 35, at 327.
61. While aspects of a policy perspective have achieved widespread accept-
ance, far more fundamental changes in the schools were called for by Lasswell
& McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the
Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1947), and McDougal, The Law School of the
Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Community, 56
YALE L.J. 1345 (1947). Notwithstanding the many post-World War II curricula
changes, Stevens concluded that the McDougal-Lasswell challenge was largely
ignored. Stevens, supra note 10, at 512-13, 526-27, 529-42. But see, e.g., Miller, Re-
vising the Torts Course, 21 U. Mum L REV. 558, 559-60 (1967); A Symposium in
Honor of Hardy C. Dillard: Legal Education, 54 VA. L REV. 583 (1968) (articles
responding to Lasswell and McDougal).
62. Wilson, Book Review, 25 CONmELL I REV. 653, 655 (1940). See also A.
HARNo, supra note 17, at 69.
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an interdisciplinary enterprise, 63 with courses and research on
law and some other discipline being commonplace. There is in-
creased attention to public law and legislation,64 to field exper-
iences, 65 and to such "cultural courses" as Jurisprudence, Law
and Society, and Comparative Law.66 As part of this trend, old
course boundaries are redrawn, the traditional pigeonholes are
discarded, and "new" courses are created.67
In this model, the recognition of a new field in the law is a
"phenomenon [which] takes place in response to dramatic
shifts in technological, political and cultural organization of our
society. Law, by its nature, reflects what is .... "68 This func-
tional reorganization of the curriculum has been described by
Brainerd Currie as the most important single development in
legal education in half a century.69
E. THE FIFTH MODEL: A NEW VISION?
A new vision of legal education may be emerging, though
we may not yet be able fully to comprehend what it entails.
Some find the clinical movement to be the most significant
among recent developments. They see clinical education as not
just skills training, but as education for professional responsi-
bility.70 In the view of these educators, one key contribution of
63. In the functional approach, the economic, social and philosophic set-
ting of doctrine is considered. E. BROWN, supra note 55, at 99.
64. Arthur S. Miller, in analyzing "the impact of public-law on legal educa-
tion," discussed such items as the addition of new courses to the curriculum,
the change in teaching materials, increased attention to the legislature and the
bureaucracy, and nonlitigation skills and techniques. Miller, The Impact of
Public Law on Legal Education, 12 J. LEGAL EDuc. 483 (1960).
65. The values of the Practice Model have been increasingly incorporated
into the former law school program. In recognition that lawyers need a broader
range of skills than case analysis alone could provide, there have been im-
provements in moot courts, and increased course offerings in drafting instru-
ments, legal bibliography, and office and trial practice. Clinical courses are now
widely available; in connection with these offerings many schools offer field ex-
periences. See the early developments reported in A. REED, supra note 16, at
260, 283. See also Committee on Curriculum of the Association of American
Law Schools, The Place of Skills in Legal Education, 45 COLUM. L REV. 345
(1945); Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School, 81 U. PA. L REv. 907 (1933);
Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947).
66. See D. JACKSON & E. GEE, BREAD AND BUTrEm ELEcrIvEs IN AMERIcAN
LEGAL EDUCATION' (1975).
67. See E. BROWN, supra note 55, at 134-56.
68. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 9. "If seashells are currency, we will have
a detailed, intricate and comprehensive law of wampum." Id.
69. See Currie, The Materials of Law Study, 8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 73 (1955).
70. See, e.g., Marden, Introduction to CouNcIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY, LAWYERS, CLIENTS & ETHICs: USING THE LAW
SCHOOL CLINIC FOR TEACHING PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmurY at viii (1974)
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clinical education is that it immerses the student in the reali-
ties of responsibility for an individual client. This experience
helps the student become a '"people-oriented counselor and ad-
vocate. ' 71 Other recent law school trends emphasize the in-
sights of humanism and psychology.72 The Langdellian model
is rejected, not so much for its narrow vision of the law, but for
its dehumanizing effects on the student, effects that are
thought to result from harsh versions of the Socratic method.7 3
A third current in the law schools includes attention to theories
of justice,7 4 providing a rival to the scientific and instrumental-
ist orientation of the law-economics approach to law. This ju-
risprudence directs the student's attention to problems of
values.
"Current," "movement," and "trend" are terms which sug-
gest that it remains unclear whether our age is giving rise to a
Fifth Model of the law school. It may be that clinical, humanis-
tic, psychological, and ethical orientations are part of a coher-
ent whole. If so, moral concern for the individual may be a
theme that connects all of the orientations that are a part of the
Fifth Model.
F. THE FIVE VISIONS TODAY
Schools approximating each of the five visions or models of
legal education coexist today; moreover, a law student at any
school may be exposed to each. The office apprenticeships of
the nineteenth century survive in such modified forms as certi-
("One of CLEPR's principal aims in sponsoring clinical education is to expose
the law student to ethical problems as they arise in the context of live cases in
which the student is participating under faculty supervision as a para-law-
yer.").
71. See Burger, The Future of Legal Education, in SELECTED READINGS IN
CLINIcAL LEGAL EDUCATION (1973).
72. See generally Black, Some Notes on Law Schools in the Present Day, 79
YALE L.T. 505 (1970); Cohen, Toward Radical Reform, 24 J. LEGAL EDUC. 210
(1972); Paisley, Moral Basis of Legal Education, 44 N. DAY. L. REv. 1053 (1969);
Redmount, Humanistic Law Through Legal Education, 1 CoNN. L. REv. 201
(1968); Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE LJ. 1402 (1965);
Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE LJ. 444 (1970).
73. See Kennedy, supra note 19, at 73; Stone, supra note 19, at 392; Watson,
supra note 19, at 93.
74. See Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern
American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27 (1979). John Rawls's A Theory of
Justice (1973) is perhaps the most commonly discussed theory of justice in law
schools today. For other important jurisprudential works which seem to be
part of the curriculum in the emerging Fifth Model of legal education, see R.
DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEMOUSLY (1977); R. NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE AND
UTOPIA (1974).
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fled student practice7 5 and clinical7 6 programs. The Practice
Model also underlies other experiences that are important
parts of many students' legal education, though not always re-
garded as such by curriculum planners: summer legal employ-
ment,7 7 post-graduation judicial clerkships, 7 8 and the informal
instruction of new lawyers by their seniors in larger firms or in
the courthouses. 7 9 The nineteenth century system of lectures,
or lectures and texts with rules to be memorized, survives in
bar review courses. Continuing education programs for law-
yers sometimes also employ a nineteenth-century Rules Model
of legal education. 80 Most first-year courses, and many upper-
year courses, stress a system of logically organized principles
taught through cases by Langdellian methods in accordance
with the Principles Model.81 Following the Policy Model, many
courses are also likely to supplement case analysis with consid-
erations of policy.82 Moreover, unlike their predecessors of a
hundred years ago,83 lawyers now generally precede their for-
mal legal training with four years of liberal arts or technical
75. On certified law student programs, see CouNcIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION
FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, STATE RULES PERMITrING THE STUDENT
PRACTICE OF LAW (2d ed. 1973).
76. See note 65 supra.
77. On the rise of the custom of student clerkship in law firms, at least for
better students and better schools, see J. SELIGMAN, supra note 33, at 91.
78. See generally Oakley & Thompson, Law Clerks in Judges' Eyes: Tradi-
tion and Innovation in the Use of Legal Staff by American Judges, 67 CALIF. L,
REV. 1286 (1979).
79. One group of educators, for example, came to the conclusion that it is
the function of the bar or others, not of the law school, to provide practical in-
struction bridging the gap to practice. UNIVERsrrY OF MICHIGAN LAw SCHOOL,
THE LAw SCHOOLS LOOK AHEAD: 1959 CONFERENCE ON LEGAL EDUCATION 11
(1959).
80. See Stumpf, Continuing Legal Education: Its Role in Tomorrow's Prac-
tice of the Law, 49 A.B.A.J. 248, 249 (1963).
81. See text accompanying notes 32-51 supra. In 1950 a law professor,
whose views are not atypical of teachers of basic courses, wrote, "Yes-I am an
old-fashioned fellow; I am still foolish and orthodox enough to believe in the
Tirst principles of our common law,' as a medium of class instruction."
Wormser, "Cases on Private Corporations", 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 485, 487 (1950).
82. But see Cohen, Introduction to THE LAw SCHOOL OF ToMoRRow 3 (D.
Haber & J. Cohen eds. 1968) (stating that there is still a "widespread and
deeply felt notion that the law schools of today [1968] are, in the main, trade
schools concerned more with sharpening how-to-do-it skills than with the con-
sequences of doing it, or with why or whether the how-to-do-it should be
done").
83. In the nineteenth century, it was not customary for law schools to re-
quire any prior college work. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 527. While it
has been said that the Harvard of Story's and Greenleafs era consisted mostly
of college graduates, id. at 528, the Harvard rules for the Story-Greenleaf years
declared "No examination and no particular course of previous study are nec-
essary for admission... ." D. HOFFMAN, supra note 40, at 556.
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studies at college, 84 which may facilitate their ability to under-
stand legal doctrine in its social and cultural context. Liberal
arts education, clinical experiences, humanistic teacher-student
relationships, and emphasis on individual-oriented law and on
ethical questions, all contribute to an appreciation of the
human dimension of the law consistent with the emerging Fifth
Model of the law school.
Education matching any of the five visions has its value.
The purposes of each model are varied and complex, but if one
were to characterize each in a phrase, one might say that the
Practice Model eases the student's transition into the day-to-
day role of his craft; the Rules Model facilitates entry into the
profession by supplying information useful for passing bar ex-
ams and for analyzing basic legal questions; the Principles
Model teaches how to "think like a lawyer"--it instructs stu-
dents in one of the modes of analysis useful for lawyering; the
Policy Model provides education for a legal career recognizing
that lawyers are, of necessity, lawmakers; and. the Fifth Model
helps the student function in the human context of legal prac-
tice.
I. CRITERIA FOR RECOGNIZING A LEGAL FIELD
In the past, the recognition of subjects for inclusion in the
curriculum of law schools has not always been approached sys-
tematically.8 5 One law school will respond to a major new so-
cial development by adding a course in Law and Atomic
Energy, others will not. Predilections of individual textbook
writers have been followed by some professors, but not by
others. How systematically does the usual faculty, for example,
consider the questions raised by one professor about institut-
ing a course in Art and Law:86 does the proposed course define
a field and do legal activities involving the subject frequently
84. See Blaustein, College and Law School Education of the American
Lawyer (pts. 1-2), 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 409 (1951) and 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 294 (1952);
Vanderbilt, A Report on Prelegal Education, 25 N.Y.U. L. REv. 199 (1950).
85. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
86. See Merryman, A Course in Art and the Law, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 551
(1974). "A related source of interest in this field was a desire to determine
whether it really was a field. I took a great deal of razzing from colleagues who
thought the whole enterprise frivolous and insubstantial. . . ." Id. at 552. See
also Kelly, A New Nominee for the Curriculum-Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Law, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97 (1959); Rabin, Administrative Law In Transition: A
Discipline in Search of an Organizing Principle, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 120 (1977);
Rasco, The Need for a Latin-American Program in the Law School Curriculum,
2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 180 (1949).
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arise in real life? This section considers criteria, appropriate to
each of the five models of legal education, that help in deter-
mining whether a separate field of study should be recognized.
The proposed field of Law and Aging will be tested against each
of the criteria.
A. CRITERIA UNDER THE PRACTICE MODEL
"Law is what lawyers do" reads the simplest, if somewhat
circular, definition of law.87 A change in the role of lawyers
would thus justify, even require, revision of law school curric-
ula under the Practice Model, which recognizes a new field of
law on the basis of practical considerations rather than on any
unifying conceptual theme.
Lawyers today in both private and government practice do
increasing amounts of Law and Aging work that requires a spe-
cial expertise.88 Much of this work involves the public benefit
programs: Social Security,89 disability,90 Supplemental Secur-
ity Income,91 Medicare, 92 Medicaid, 93 and veterans' benefits.9 4
Government social service agencies that distribute benefits to
the elderly employ lawyers to write regulations and adjudicate
appeals. Legal services programs and others use lawyers to
challenge rules and awards.95 There are also opportunities for
remunerative private practice under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 197496 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967.97 The laws are complex and the
amounts involved are vast: pension funds of over $470 billion,98
87. Compare the idea that law (i.e., the rules of law) consist of what judges
(or law officials generally) do. See K. LLEwELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1960
ed.).
88. See INSTITE OF LAW AND AGING, SURVEY OF NATIONAL LAw SCHOOL
PROGRAMS AND MATERIALS in LAw AND AGING (1978).
89. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-431 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
90. Id.
91. Id. §§ 1381-1383c.
92. Social Security Amendments of 1972, §§ 1396-1396k (1976 & Supp. II
1978).
93. Id. §§ 1395-1395qq (1976 & Supp. 1 1978).
94. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-3857 (1976 & Supp. 1 1978).
95. See generally Marlin & Brown, The Elderly Poor. An Overview of the
Legal Services Attorney's Responsibilities, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 192 (1972);
Nathanson, Legal Services for the Nation's Elderly, 17 ARiz. L REV. 275 (1975).
96. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
98. At the end of 1978, the combined assets of private pension funds
amounted to $321 billion; the retirement systems of state and local govern-
ments had assets of $148.5 billion. Raskin, Pensions Funds Could be the Unions'
Secret Weapon, FORTUNE, Dec. 31, 1979, at 64. Another estimate of the assets of
the state and local systems, as of 1975, put the figure at over $100 billion. PEN-
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social security payments of almost $93 billion annually,9 9 and
other government programs for the elderly of over $24 billion
annually.100
Another criterion for recognizing a field of law under the
Practice Model is the existence of a distinct group of clients.
There are perhaps thirty-two million potential clients for law-
yers expert in Law and Aging.' 0 ' The size of this group, along
with the increased militancy of the elderly in asserting their
rights, indicate that Law and Aging is a growth area for the
practice of law.
In addition, if a field of law is administered by separate
courts, it can profitably be considered a separate field of law
under the Practice Model. The legal realists of forty years ago
suggested that we recognize specialized government adminis-
trative agencies as "courts" of a new kind and establish new
courses for each one. Although there are no special courts
dealing with problems of the elderly, there are administrative
tribunals that frequently rule on the specialized claims of the
elderly. 0 2 By recognizing Law and Aging as a field of study,
law schools could prepare students for practice in these fo-
rums.
B. CRITERIA UNDER THE RULES MODEL
Under the Rules Model, students learn rules that are stated
in didactic texts. The existence of a distinct body of knowledge
is a criterion for the definition of a field of law under this
model. The volume of research in Law and Aging increases
each year. The Law and Aging bibliography prepared by the
University of Southern California Law Center Library shows
that the number of works published annually in this area has
doubled and redoubled each year since 1975.103 The American
SION TASK FORCE, SUBCOMM. ON LABOR STANDARDS, HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCA-
TION AND LABOR, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., INTERIM REPORT ON AcTIVITIEs 1 (Comm.
Print 1976). See generally P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION (1976); W.
GREENOUGH & F. KING, PENSION PLANS AND PUBUC POLICY (1976).
99. In 1978, the Old Age, Survivors and Disability insurance program of So-
cial Security paid out cash benefits of almost $93 billion. Current Operating
Statistics, 43 SOC. SEC. BULL. No. 5, 30, at 31, Table M-1 (May 1980).
100. Estimates for 1979 indicate that Supplemental Security Income paid
out $1.8 billion, the Federal civilian retfrement systems paid out about $12.2 bil-
lion, and veterans' payments were about $10.7 billion. Samuelson, supra note
15, at 258-59.
101. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
102. See generally H. MCCORMICK, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID CLAIMS AND
PROCEDURES (1977).
103. J. MUBURAK, D. SAPIENZA & R. SisN, GERONTOLOGY AND LAW. A
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Civil Liberties Union series of handbooks dealing with the
rights of various groups has been extended to the elderly,104
and two series of teaching materials for Law and Aging are be-
ing issued. 0 5 These materials 06 help to create the very field
they deal with by facilitating legal research and the teaching of
courses.10 7
Traditionally, under the Rules Model the definition of law
courses has also been influenced by considerations of educa-
tional practicality and convenience which, regardless of the
model that predominates, remain important considerations to-
day. For example, as David Riesman has said, there is a divi-
sion of labor among courses as well as a balancing of personnel,
library resources, and such.108 Moreover, law schools are not
immune to factors causing overall trends in universities today:
the rise of multi-disciplinary activities; the stress on "rele-
vance," defined as short-term practicality; the willingness to en-
gage in public service activities; the responsiveness to the
availability of outside non-tuition funding the search for pro-
grams attractive to new student populations in the face of pro-
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1979); see Cohen, Legal Research Issues on Aging, 14
GERONTOLOGIST 263 (1974); Levine, supra note 11. See generally Levine, Themes
and Issues in Gerontology and Law, 73 L. LIB. J. 259 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Themes and Issues].
104. See R. BROWN, THE RIGHTS OF OLDER PERSONS (1979).
105. The Senior Adults Legal Assistance program in Palo Alto, California, is
preparing, under Federal grant, a series: S.A.L.A. Curriculum Materials on Ag-
ing and the Law. The Institute of Law and Aging of George Washington Uni-
versity has prepared a Law School Series of materials on Legal Problems of the
Elderly, regarded as "unpublished" but available upon request.
106. Additionally, the NSCLC Washington Weekly of the National Senior
Citizens Law Center publishes current case law, legislative, and agency devel-
opments; the Gerontologist regularly runs law-related articles; the Journal of
Gerontology has a regular update on periodical literature in Law and Aging;
and a new series of reprints and monographs, Papers in Law and Aging, is
forthcoming from the University of Southern California. Among manuals and
symposia available on the subject, see DUKE UNIVERSrrY CENTER FOR THE
STUDY OF AGING AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF OLDER AMERI-
CANS: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE (1975); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON SENIOR
CITIZENS, INC., THE LAW AND AGING MANUAL (1975); J. WEISS, LAW OF THE ELD-
ERLY (1977); Special Section on Legal Problems of the Elderly, 9 CONN. L. REV.
425 (1977); Symposium: Law and the Aged, 17 ARIz. L. REv. 267 (1975).
107. A number of themes can be identified that raise questions.fundamental
to the field of Law and Aging. Can the nation "afford" the increasing number of
retired persons? How should government programs for the aged be organized
and financed? Is it legitimate for the law to deal with older persons in terms of
their age, or does such a practice constitute age discrimination? Is it possible
to provide older persons with autonomous, independent lifestyles comparable
to those enjoyed by them throughout their adult years? For a discussion of the
major substantive topics and themes in Law and Aging, see Themes and Issues,
supra note 103.
108. See Riesman, supra note 5, at 643-44.
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jected declining numbers of traditional university-age students;
the attempt to combine vocational usefulness with other, lib-
eral, academic goals; the attempt by upwardly-mobile schools
to stake out areas in which distinction can be achieved, taking
account of social need, weakness of competition, and existing
strengths; and so on. While these items may not give rise to an
intellectual justification for any given course or activity, they
nevertheless reflect pressures actually at work. No extensive
discussion is needed to demonstrate that teaching, research,
and related activities in Law and Aging are responsive to these
demands.
C. CRITERIA UNDER THE PRINCIPLES MODEL
Under the Principles Model, axioms of law are studied
through case analysis, and each conceptual field of law is
thought to have its own set of principles. This model of legal
education requires that fields of study have theories and con-
cepts that are so interrelated that they appear to stem from an
original set of axioms. This can be considered a Langdellian re-
quirement.109 Law and Aging has certain unifying themes," 0
but may not meet this criterion of rigor. There exist other
fields of law that are already recognized, however, that may not
meet this axiomatic standard either. Moreover, there is more
than one way to achieve axiomatic rigor. Langdell himself dis-
carded cases that were not in accord with the principles he had
perceived."' Thus it may be that some subset of the cases on
Law and Aging would satisfy the Langdellian requirement of
axiomatic rigor.
A post-Langdellian version of this criterion may also be
proposed. Although legal scholarship today still strives for sci-
109. Langdell's curricular divisions at Harvard have been contrasted with
those adopted contemporaneously by Pomeroy at Hastings. See note 43 supra.
A Pomeroy partisan writes that for Langdell, the law was "reduced to so many
discrete groupings of doctrines reflecting a practical development that was
principally jurisdictional and 'remedial.'... What parts should be taught was,
of course, a matter of curriculum planning, though largely dictated by the prac-
tical dimension . . . ." T. BARNEs, supra note 43, at 111. By contrast, "[t]he
Pomeroy System was above all a systematic, logical structuring of branches of
the law .... [T]he arrangement and relationship of one branch to another
* . . allowed for creative systematization." Id. at 101-02. In every branch of law,
Pomeroy built an architectonic structure differentiating primary rights and du-
ties and remedial rights and duties, with increasingly fine and detailed subdivi-
sions. Id. at 102-03, 107.
110. See Themes and Issues, supra note 103.
111. '"The vast majority [of cases] are useless, worse than useless, for any
purpose of systematic study." C. LANGDEI, supra note 34, at viii.
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entific principles with intellectual coherence, it has largely
abandoned Langdell's nineteenth-century model of natural sci-
ence, and has substituted the analogy of the twentieth-century
social sciences. The prototype of this trend was the use of field
observation methods by Underhill Moore at Yale to study the
effects of various permutations of parking regulation
schemes." 2 In contemporary scholarship, Richard Posner has
called for "the application of scientific methods to the study of
the legal system ... to discover and explain the recurrent pat-
terns . . . -the 'laws' of the system"." 3 In this approach, a
field would be an appropriate unit of "legal science" if regulari-
ties were discoverable through a social science method.
Law and Aging may well satisfy this criterion. Economists
have found gerontology an "important [though still] relatively
unexplored, area of economic analysis."" 4 Against this demon-
stration of interest, however, some have expressed disillu-
sion. 1 5 Law and Aging as a field, if established by virtue of this
criterion, thus runs the risk of standing or falling with the for-
tunes of the reputation of the external social science employed.
Another criterion for determining if an area represents a
distinct field of study is if the substantive rules of the subject
matter differ from those in other fields. The existence of differ-
ing rules implies differing underlying axioms, even if the axi-
oms themselves cannot yet be perceived. This criterion was
applied by the initiator of Stanford's Art and Law course to de-
termine whether the subject matter constituted a field.116 He
found that works of art, artists, and institutions in the art world
were treated, for legal purposes, differently from those in other
spheres of society, and thus concluded that special rules of law
112. See U. MOORE, LAw AND LEARNING THEORY: A STUDY IN LEGAL CON-
TROL (1943).
113. Posner, Volume One of the Journal of Legal Studies-An Afterword, 1
J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 437 (1972).
114. Clark, Kreps & Spengler, Economics of Aging: A Survey, 16 J. EcoN.
LIT. 919, 949-50 (1978).
115. Professor Gilmore has written:
After two hundred years of anguished labor, the great hypothesis [that
there are observable regularities in social behavior or in societal devel-
opment] has produced nothing....
One lesson which we can draw from all this is that the hypothesis
itself is in error.... So far as we have been able to learn, there are no
recurrent patterns in the course of human events; it is not possible to
make scientific statements about history, sociology, economics-or law.
G. GILMORE, supra note 32, at 99-100. See also Left, Economic Analysis of Law:
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451, 458-59 (1974); Left, Law
and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1007-08 (1978).
116. See Merryman, supra note 86, at 552.
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applied to the art world." 7 Applying this criterion to the eld-
erly, there are many statutes that treat older people differently
than the young." 8 In addition, many statutes that are age-neu-
tral on their face have special applicability to the elderly, such
as the laws on inheritance, wills, probate, estate tax, civil com-
mitment, conservatorship, and guardianship." 9 The existence
of a distinct body of law relating to the elderly suggests the
possibility that underlying axioms may be derived and that
Law and Aging is an appropriate candidate for recognition as a
field.
D. CRrTERIA UNDER THE POLICY MODEL
Under the Policy Model, sociological considerations are in-
tegrated into the study of law in an attempt to deal with public
policy issues. Legal and nonlegal data supplement case analy-
sis. The primary criterion for the recognition of a field under
this model is the determination of whether society faces a sig-
nificant group of interrelated problems that could benefit from
unified legal treatment. Proponents of this model maintain that
the traditional formal categories of law, shaped by accident and
maintained by tradition, obscure the social problems with
which law actually deals; the traditional framework thus yields
an artificial perspective. Under the Policy Model, law is reorga-
nized along more functional lines, corresponding to the types of
human activity involved.
The problems of the elderly encompassed in a course on
Law and Aging represent a body of study suitable for a func-
tionally defined course. Legal questions affecting the elderly
involve broad questions of social policy. Their solution re-
quires knowledge of legal and nonlegal data and an under-
standing of the social, economic, historical, and philosophical
issues raised. Thus, for example, the laws affecting mandatory
retirement should not be altered without an understanding of
the relationship between retirement policies and issues of infla-
tion, unemployment, and education.
117. Id.
118. See notes 89-94 supra; R. HAROOTYAN, ANNOTATED INDEX OF FEDERAL
LEGISLATION IMPACTING ON THE ELDERLY (1977) (listing over sixty statutes). At
present, however, there are no constitutional principles which treat the elderly
differently from young people. See generally Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93
(1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Levine,
"Age Discrimination" as a Legal Concept for Analyzing Age-Work Issues, in
WoRKc AND RETIREMENT. POLICY IssuEs (R. Ragan ed. 1980).
119. See generally Themes and Issues, supra note 103.
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Another criterion under the Policy Model might be whether
the client group in question sees itself as deserving new
"rights" and separate legal treatment. This is a related, but less
mundane, version of the Practice Model criterion,120 which
dealt with the existence of clients. Here the clients not only
meet Marx's criterion for a class objectively having a common
interest, but also that for a class subjectively recognizing them-
selves as a separate social group.121 For example, it became
necessary to train lawyers in the field of race relations and,
more recently, in the field of women's rights, not because of
any sudden shift in the ethnic and sexual demographic statis-
tics, but because members of the relevant groups increasingly
recognized themselves in such terms when considering legal
claims, and turned to the law for specialized legal protection.
Analysis linking a change in ideas to the emergence of the
elderly as a self-conscious group belongs to the perspective of
the sociology of knowledge, or social construction of reality, as
propounded by thinkers like Karl Mannheim. 22 Different
groups have their own unique historical experiences, which
give rise to different interpretations of the world, and therefore
ultimately to different systems of knowledge. Although it has
been argued that the elderly retain their lifelong political orien-
tation and are too disparate in interest and ideology to consider
themselves part of a unity,123 there are evidently large numbers
of elderly who recognize a shared interest.124 Under a sociology
of knowledge approach, the development of the elderly as a so-
cial group sharing certain experiences explains the emergence
of such ideas as age discrimination, elder's rights, "gray
power," and the field of Law and Aging. Lawyers and scholars,
since they are groups dependent on their clients and subjects,
come to share these concepts with the elderly.
E. CRrTERIA UNDER THE FIFTH MODEL
Under what may be an emerging Fifth Model of the law
120. See text accompanying notes 87-102 supra.
121. See K. MARx, THE POVERTY OF PHILOSOPHY 146-47 (1963 ed.). See also 2
K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND rrs ENEMIES 115 (3d rev. ed. 1957); Glantz,
Class Consciousness and Political Solidarity, 23 AM. Soc. REV. 375 (1958).
122. See K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SO-
CIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1929). See also P. BERGER & T. LucKmAN, THE So-
CIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966).
123. See Hudson & Binstock, Political Systems and Aging, in HANDBOOK OF
AGING AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 372 (R. Binstock & E. Shanas eds. 1976).
124. See Ragan & Dowd, The Emerging Political Consciousness of the Aged.
A Generational Interpretation, 30 J. Soc. ISSUES 154-56 (No. 3, 1974).
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school, the student is trained to focus on the individual human
needs and rights of the client. Perhaps an appropriate criterion
for recognizing a field under this vision of legal education is
whether the candidate field requires the individual lawyer to
develop a particular interpersonal capability. Some fields, for
example, require particular sensitivities if the lawyer is to in-
teract successfully with clients-perhaps poverty law, prison
law, and similar fields. Law and Aging, as a field for counseling
and advocacy on behalf of individual clients, satisfies this crite-
rion. Many professionals-including lawyers, psychiatrists, so-
cial workers, and others-exhibit a bias or personal distaste
that inhibits them from effectively serving old and infirm cli-
ents. 125 A course enabling lawyers to overcome this limitation
on their professional capacities would thus serve a special
function.
A different criterion that might be associated with the Fifth
Model is whether a candidate field encompasses distinct issues
of values and justice. Under this criterion, Law and Aging can
make a contribution to the law school curriculum. Treatment
of the elderly by society raises many complex ethical issues,
such as whether differential treatment of the elderly consti-
tutes invidious discrimination.126 A number of unique factors
bear on this question and render the issue of discrimination
against the elderly analytically distinct from discrimination
against other groups. The middle-aged majority makes laws for
the elderly, but each member of the majority hopes or expects
to become old some day. In addition, the old have had their
turn at whatever special advantages the middle-aged enjoy and
they are, moreover, often different in important ways from the
middle-aged. At the same time that the elderly receive group-
specific disabilities, they also receive group-specific benefits.
As a result, we find the seeming paradox of advocates of the
rights of the elderly condemning "discrimination" while they
affi "reverse discrimination."' 27 Because quite different ar-
guments are voiced in the factual context of age discrimination
than are raised in the context of race relations, the question of
125. See R. BUTLER, WHY SuRvIvE? BEING OLD IN AMERICA 233-34 (1975); W.
SCHOFIELD, PSYCHOTHERAPY 133 (1974) (discussing "yavis syndrome"--the ten-
dency of psychotherapists to treat young, attractive, verbal, intelligent, and suc-
cessful (which means well-paying) clientele); Mutschler, Factors Affecting
Choice of and Perseveration in Social Work with the Aged, 11 GERONTOLOGIST
231 (1971).
126. See Levine, Four Models for Age/Work Policy Research, 20 GERoNToLO-
GIST 561(1980); Themes and Issues, supra note 103.
127. See Themes and Issues, supra note 103.
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discrimination in the context of the elderly makes a special
contribution to the student's education in issues of values and
justice.
A third criterion for a new field under the Fifth Model may
be whether recognition of the field makes some special contri-
bution to assisting individuals with their legal concerns. Law
and Aging satisfies this criterion as well. Lawyers, whether in-
formed or not, will be making important decisions affecting eld-
erly persons in the years ahead.128 The youth-dominated
culture of America leads many persons to ignore the problems
of the elderly until they face such problems personally. Adding
a course in Law and Aging to the law school curriculum would
be a step towards educating lawyers to make decisions affect-
ing older people intelligently, would encourage research, and
would help enlighten the growth of legal do&rine and legisla-
tion. It is hoped that after taking such a course the next gener-
ation of lawyers would be better able to deal with problems
affecting tens of millions of Americans.
III. CONCLUSION: DOES IT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE?
Within the criteria imposed by the five different visions of
the law school, Law and Aging is a suitable topic for recogni-
tion as a separate field of study. Within a Practice Model of le-
gal education, if law is what lawyers do, then indeed many
lawyers already "do" Law and Aging, and the number of spe-
cialists, both within and without government agencies, is in-
creasing. 29 There is a large and growing clientele with needs
to be served. Under the Rules Model, it was noted that there is
a considerable and increasing body of knowledge on Law and
Aging.130 There are also many practical considerations which
may tip the scales in favor of separate offerings in Law and Ag-
ing for law schools of all orientations. Although there may be
doubt under the Principles Model as to whether there are un-
derlying principles approaching Langdellian axiomatic rigor ev-
ident in the case law on Law and Aging, a post-Langdellian
criterion of law as science may be met in the social scientific
treatment of Law and Aging.13 1 There is also a substantial
body of law treating the elderly differently from other persons
128. Levine, People-Oriented Law Confronts Problems of the Elderly, 1
CrrEs-(1980).
129. See notes 88-97 supra and accompanying text.
130. See notes 103-07 supra and accompanying text.
131. See notes 112-14 supra and accompanying text.
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that may some day be organized in axioms of a traditional
Langdellian type. In considering the Policy Model, it was ar-
gued that the problems of aging should have available the ful-
lest contribution the law can make, especially since the elderly
are increasingly vocal in their demands for specialized treat-
ment.132 Within the Fifth Model, recognition of Law and Aging
as a new field of law would help the future lawyer handle pro-
fessionally a distinct set of interpersonal relations with a spe-
cial client group and would raise unique issues of values.133
It may be objected that it is not very meaningful to con-
sider whether one set of topics or another should be recognized
as a separate field of law. Since the goals of law schools can be
achieved through any of a variety of course offerings,134 it is un-
derstandable that a good deal of ridicule has been leveled at
the renaming of courses. After all, as Walter Wheeler Cook
suggested in another context, line drawing between classifica-
tions is more or less arbitrarily done for the purposes of con-
venience: any given material can be organized according to
various schemes.13 5
Moreover, even if a new field of study, like Law and Aging,
is recognized, there is no guarantee that a course will be listed
in a law school's bulletin or that anyone will take it. The three-
year substantive law curriculum is already overcrowded1 36
skill courses and courses intended to provide broad perspective
on law in society make further demands on student time. Ob-
servers remark that most law students prefer "bread and but-
ter" courses which give "pure, old-fashioned Hessian-
training"137-rule-oriented courses that will meet client de-
mands.
Nevertheless, questions about the "proper" subdivisions in
the law curriculum are important. Historically such questions
132. See notes 123-24 supra and accompanying text.
133. See notes 125-28 supra and accompanying text.
134. The use of specific subject matter courses for wider curricular goals
arose once law schools abandoned the mission of teaching all of the law. See
Kelso, supra note 7, at 529. When the goals of the law school curriculum are
expanded to go beyond the teaching of specific legal doctrines, such as contrib-
uting to reform of the legal order by training lawyers to advance the cause of
social justice, most any course may be used as a vehicle to this end. See Allen,
One Aspect of the Problem of Relevance in Legal Education, 54 VA. L REV. 595,
605 (1968); Pincus, Reforming Legal Education, 53 A.B.A.J. 436, 437 (1967).
135. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE
L.J. 333, 352 (1933).
136. See Prosser, The Ten Year Curriculum, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC. 149, 151 (1953).
137. Stevens, supra note 10, at 526-27 (quoting Bergin, The Law Teacher: A
Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REV. 637, 643 (1968)).
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have played a crucial role in the evolution of legal culture. Dif-
ferences in the organization of curricula are decisive for law be-
cause they establish and endorse different epistemological
categories and values. As David Riesman said:
Whether we go all the way with Kant or not, the categories in which we
view "reality" are obviously of vital importance.... A division of a
criminal law course into categories of "larceny," "arson," and "in-
sanity" will tend to engender one kind of attitude, and "prevention of
socially undesirable behavior" and "the problem of conflicting values"
another, preferable, point of view.138
Thus, Riesman regards the choices made by law professors not
only as necessary, but as important in guiding legal thinking to-
wards a selected matrix of social issues. The enterprise of re-
flecting upon how and why we categorize our intellectual
universe in the law and come to recognize new fields may stim-
ulate similar questioning about established courses and fields.
The major remapping of the law a century ago that gave us
such fields as contracts13 9 and tortsl40 may now be due for re-
consideration to reflect changes in legal practice and society.
The curriculum of the future141 may be conceived less in terms
of corporations and property as reified entities, and more in
terms of the needs of individual human beings and of the soci-
ety.
138. See Riesman, supra note 5, at 642.
139. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
140. There was no law book on the subject of torts until 1859. See White,
The Intellectual Origins of Torts in America, 86 YALE UJ. 671, 671 (1977).
141. On the future of legal education, see generally McKay, Legal Educa-
tion in AMERICAN LAw: THE THIRD CENTURY 1 (B. Schwartz ed. 1976).
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